1	See discussion in, among others, Ross, Robert, (ed). After the Cold War, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1998, pp.
2	This is taken from Harding, Harry, Public Engagement In American Foreign Policy, The American Assembly, Columbia University, February 23-25, 1995, pp. 8-9.
3	For an analysis, see among others, Ross, Robert, op. cit., pp. 74-77.
4	American proponents of this view often are focused on specific issues like human rights, trade policy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or others. One articulation of this school is seen in the work by Joseph Nye entitled Bound To Lead, Harvard University Press, 1992.
5	For background, see China-U.S. Relations, by Kerry Dumbaugh, CRS Issue Brief 98018, and China: Interest Groups and Recent U.S. Policy, by Robert Sutter and Peter Mitchner, CRS Report 97-48.
6	Presidential candidate Clinton had strongly supported these congressional debates in 1992, but gradually reversed his policy until he decided in 1994 to delink the annual waiver from China's human rights and other policy practices and behavior.
7	See, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, by Larry Niksch, CRS Issue Brief 91141.
8	See, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne Morrison, CRS Issue Brief 91121, and Japan-U.S. Trade, CRS Info Pack IP201J.
9	See, The Asian Financial crisis, the IMF, and Japan, by Dick Nanto, CRS Report 98-434, and The Asian Financial Crisis, by Richard Cronin, CRS Report 98-74.
10	See, Burma-U.S. Relations, by Larry Niksch, CRS Report 96-3;, Indonesia-U.S. Relations, by Larry Niksch, CRS Report 97-186; and Cambodia, by Robert Sutter, CRS Issue Brief 98036.
11	These points were confirmed with congressional staff interviewed in October 1998.
12	The Appropriations Committees have been seen to step into this situation and used the "power of the purse" to "influence policy (see discussion of North Korea on Page 13).
13	Leading proponents of this view regarding East Asia include Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.
14	In this regard, a Senate staff member emphasized a perspective on the ongoing U.S. congressional debate on China that was also echoed by some others. He viewed the congressional coalition against the Administration's China policy as led by elements of the political right and the political left, who under other circumstances appeared to have little in common. Thus, in the ranks of congressional critics of the Administration's China policy were seen religious conservatives concerned about Chinese practices on abortions and treatment of independent Christian worship; Members with strong pro-labor leanings, along with right-populists sympathetic to Patrick Buchanan and Ross Perot who have common ground in their concern about loss of U.S. jobs overseas; liberal leaning Members concerned with human rights abuses in Tibet and the suppression of dissent in China; and Members concerned with China's rising military power as a possible security danger to U.S. interests. Allied against this coalition, in the view of this staff member, are Members of the generally pro-business wings of both parties, who tend to favor continued trade and investment with China.
15	By contrast, bilateral security issues with Japan were rarely mentioned. One staff member highlighted problems for U.S. bases in Okinawa. For background, see Japan-U.S. Relations, CRS Issue Brief 97004.
16	About half of those interviewed discussed North Korean issues in some detail. Three of them were inclined to "walk away" from the agreed framework if North Korea did not change recent provocative policies and actions. The rest were not prepared to abandon the agreed framework.
17	Seventy million dollars in such aid was approved in the Omnibus Appropriations Bill H.R. 4328 that passed Congress and was signed into law (PL 105-277) on October 21, 1998.
18	For background, see Taiwan, by Robert Sutter, CRS Issue Brief 98034.
19	In a related development, one staffer noted a view said to be held by some in the Administration that the Clinton Administration would endeavor in 1999 to use more active U.S. government support for Taiwan's entry into the World Trade Organization WTO) as leverage to pressure PRC leaders to come to terms on WTO entry that would be acceptable to the United States. Taiwan has already reached agreements with most of its WTO trading partners, but is blocked on account of Beijing's insistence that it must enter the WTO before Taiwan. In part to urge the Clinton Administration to be more supportive of Taiwan's WTO entry despite Beijing's position, the 105th Congress passed legislation (P.L.105-277) that included a provision urging Taiwan's WTO entry. For background, see Taiwan, CRS Issue Brief 98034.

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